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It means that the sentence is definitive, no appeal
is possible. |
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Was the
Ward of
Court
question
an issue
? Here
is a
time-line,
if not
an
explanation
:
- April
2, 2008
:
Madeleine
MC is
made a
WOC, i.e
is
placed
by the
court in
the care
of a
guardian,
Mrs
Justice
Hogg.
- July
16,
2010,
Mrs
Justice
Hogg
concedes
to the
McCanns
an
authorization
to join*
their
daughter
Madeleine
in the
lawsuit
against
Gonçalo
Amaral
et al
(after
consulting
a letter
dated
July 15,
2010
from
IFLG
solicitor
of the
MCs, Ann
Thomas).
This
would
have
been
expected
to be
done the
year
before
(June
2009)
when the
McCann
family
raised
an
injunction
concerning
the book
Maddie -
a
Verdade
da
Mentira
and the
DVD.
* The
authorization
isn’t to
“represent”
their
daughter
(perhaps
this
word
only
applies
to a
lawyer).
- Maio
4, 2012
: the
July 16,
2010
document
is
copied
and
signed
by Mrs
Justice
Hogg.
Why ?
Had it
lost its
validity
since it
finally
wasn’t
used
(not
joined
to the
case) ?
- March
21, 2014
:
judgement
in the
High
Court,
the
McCann
claimants
are
represented
by IFLG
Jenny
Green.
How is
this
judgement
articulated
with the
defence’s
diligences
to
provide
the
judge
with a
WOC
certificate
?
The word
“WOC”
doesn’t
appear
anywhere
and the
parents
seem to
detain
all the
parental
responsibility.
- May
10,
2014:
decision
by the
judge
Maria
Emilia
Melo e
Castro,
likely
after
she
received
the WOC
certificate
(but
this
certificate
seems to
have
been
issued a
month
later,
in June
16)
The
sentence
mentions
that GA
was
condemned.
What for
?
- June
16, 2014
:
document
on the
judgement
of March
21, 2014
concerning
the
parental
responsibility
of the
MC,
signed
by Mrs
Justice
Hogg.
-
January
23, 2015
: letter
of the
claimants’
lawyer
to the
judge
referring
to the
decision
of May
10, 2014
and
asking
to join
to the
autos
the July
16, 2010
document.
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The
“saneador
tabelar”
dispatch
warrants
formally
that the
plea is free
from vices
and
irregularities
and in
condition to
proceed.
Being “generical”,
it usefully
means that
nothing will
forbid some
irregularity
to be
detected
afterwards |
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The
truth’s
exception
allows the
defendant to
have the
case shelved
if the proof
that the
reported
facts are
accurate can
be brought. |
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This
sentence
isn't
syntactically
correct :
"this
particular
aspect... is
the subject
of no verb,
hence (are
aspects)
should be
erased |
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In fact it
is the
article 19. |
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in
"comparing
it”, the
pronoun "it"
translates
the feminine
pronoun
which can
only,
syntactically,
refer to
"intention",
obviously a
typo, since
what is
confronted
is the
shelving of
the
investigation. |
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Art
26-1 - To
every person
are
recognized
the rights
to personal
identity,
personality
development,
civil
capacity,
citizenship,
good name
and
reputation,
image,
speech,
privacy of
private and
family life
and legal
protection
against all
forms of
discrimination. |
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Actually this ruling’s date is February 19, 2002. Summary
:
-
Journalists
are
required, as
a basic
ethical
rule, to
confrontate
versions and
opinions, to
test and
confirm the
truthfulness
of the news,
using
reliable,
diversified
and checked
sources.
- The concept of integrity and credibility of the source
and of the
information
is
translated
into a
concept or
value
judgment
about the
source, in
that it
encloses a
legal
rating,
compared in
accordance
with
criteria
established
(…) on
ethical
principles
contained in
Code of
Ethics of
Journalists.
- In the exercise of its public function ( right and duty
of
information
), it is
required
from the
press not to
publish
accusations
that affect
the honour
of
individuals,
knowing that
they are
inaccurate
or when it
has not been
possible to
find out
sufficiently. |
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Summary:
- The rights to information and free expression suffer
restrictions
that are
necessary
for the
coexistence,
in a
democratic
society, of
other rights
such as
honour and
reputation
of
individuals.
- Must be sought, above all, the "practical concordance" of
these
rights, of
information
and free
expression
on the one
hand, and of
moral
integrity
and good
name and
reputation
on the
other,
through the
indispensable
sacrifice of
both.
- In the last term, the recognition of human dignity as
supreme
value of the
democratic
constitutional
order
requires
that the
collision of
these rights
should, in
principle, be solved by the prevalence of the personality
rights
(article
332-2 of the
CC), this
just not
happening
when, in
particular,
compete
circumstances
that may, in
the light of
relevant
public
interest,
justify the
appropriateness
of opposite
solution.
- If there is genuine public interest for the community to
be informed
of certain
matters, the
duty of
disclosure
outweighs
the
discretion
imposed by
personal
interests.
- Always, however, will be required respect for a
principle,
not just of
truth,
necessity
and
appropriateness,
but also of
proportionality
(or
reasonability). |
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Smolorz
vs
Poland.
The
ECHR's
judgement,
dated 16
October
2012 and
turned
definitive
on
January
2013, is
only
available
in
French.
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx?i=001-114071
The case
is one
of
violation
of
freedom
of
expression.
The
claimant
is a
journalist
He wrote
in 2004
an
article
mocking
architects
of his
town,
Katowice,
who are
convinced
their
creations
are
great
and make
people
happy.
He
reacted
particularly
to one,
JJ, who
considered
that his
reputation
had been
damaged,
requested
excuses
and
money to
pay to a
caritative
association.
The case
went to
court.
The
Polish
court
condemned
Smolorz
to pay
JJ's
court
fees and
publish
apologies
in his
own
newspaper.
Smolorz
appealed,
arguing
his
article
was part
of a
public
debate
to which
his
opponent
even
participated
and that
forcing
him to
apology
was
denying
him the
right to
criticize
activities
that
were
part of
the
public
area.
The
appeal
court
rejected
the
journalist's
claim
for not
having
proved
that JJ
contributed
to the
ugliness
of the
city.
Smolorz
went to
the
Supreme
court,
but his
claim
was
dismissed.
The ECHR
considered
that the
claim
was
acceptable.
Then the
ECHR's
judges
considered
that
there
had been
violation
of the
art. 10.
but
rejected
Smolorz's
claim
about
elements
of
evidence
that the
Polish
Court
hadn't
accepted
and the
rejection
of the
Supreme
court to
examinate
the case
without
previous
hearing
(invoking
the art.
6 of the
Convention).
Smolors
demanded
10.000 €
for
moral
prejudice
and 310
€ for
expenses,
the ECHR
granted
him
2.000 €
and 310
€.
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The ECHR judgement on Thoma vs Luxembourg, dated March 29,
2001 and
definitive
on June
29,
2001,
exists
in
English
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx?i=001-59363
The claimant, Marc Thoma, alleged that his freedom of
expression
had been
violated.
His
request
was
partially
accepted
by the
ECHR. At
the time
of the
conflict,
as a
journalist,
he
criticized
the
behaviour
of a
public
agent in
a case
of
reforesting
(he
allegedly
had
taken a
financial
advantage).
He was
sued for
defamation
by the
association
of
forests
and
waters
administration's
public
agents.
The
court
found
that his
evidence
wasn't
sufficient. Thoma
appealed,
but the
court
condemned
him to
pay 1
symbolic
euro to
the
claimants.
The
Supreme
court
confirmed.
The ECHR judges weren't convinced that the interference of
the
administration
in the
claimant's
exercise
of his
right to
freedom
of
expression
was
"necessary
in a
democratic
society"
(cf. Art
10-2)
and
considered
art 10
had been
broken.
The claimant was awarded the 18.380 € for material damage
that he
requested,
but the
moral
damage
was
dismissed
since
his
cause
had
finally
been
heard.
He was
granted
14.875 €
for
costs
and
expenses. |
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Judgment in September 12, 2011 of Palomo Sanchez et al vs
Spain -
An
English
version
exists
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx?i=001-106178
Six delivery men of Barcelone had been dismissed by their
company,
they
argued
reprisal
for
belonging
to a
trade
union
and due
to
allegedly
offensive
content
in the
union's
newsletter
of March
2002.
They
were
accused
of
serious
misconduct,
namely
for
impugning
the
reputations
of 3
employees
of the
company
in
cartoons
and 2
articles.
The
applicants
challenged
the
dismissal
decision
before
the
Employment
Tribunal
which
dismissed
their
claims.
The
applicants
appealed
but the
High
Court of
Justice
of
Catalonia
upheld
the
judgment.
The
judges
considered
that
freedom
of
expression
had gone
beyond
the
right to
criticise
and
impugned
the
respectability
of the
persons
concerned.
The
applicants
lodged
an
appeal
with the
Constitutional
Court,
but it
was
found
inadmissible
for lack
of
constitutional
content.
The applicants solicited the ECHR, relying on art 10 and 11
of the
Convention
to state
that the
cartoons
and
articles
were
with the
limits
of what
art 10
tolerates,
being
more
joke
than
intent
to
insult.
The
(ordinary)
Chamber
considered
that
there
had been
no
violation
of Art
10 and
that no
separate
question
arose
under
Art 11.
art 11 : 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly
and to
freedom
of
association
with
others,
including
the
right to
form and
to join
trade
unions
for the
protection
of his
interests.
2. No
restrictions
shall be
placed
on the
exercise
of these
rights
other
than
such as
are
prescribed
by law
and are
necessary
in a
democratic
society
... for
the
protection
of
health
or
morals
or for
the
protection
of the
rights
and
freedoms
of
others.
The
claimants
appealed,
requesting
the
referral
to the
Grand
Chamber
which
found
that the
respondent
State
has not
failed
under
Art 10
in the
light of
Art 11. |
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Article
484 -
Who
affirms
or
spreads
a fact
capable
of
harming
the
credit
or good
name of
any
individual
or
collective
person,
is
liable
for
damages. |
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Article
483-1 -
Any
person
who,
intentionally
or
recklessly,
unlawfully
violates
the
rights
of
others
or any
legal
provision
intended
to
protect
foreign
interests
is
obliged
to
compensate
the
injured
party
for
damages
resulting
from the
breach . |
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In the
absence
of other
legal
criteria,
guilt is
judged
through
the
diligence
of a
good
citizen,
given
the
circumstances
of each
case. |
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Art
483-1
and
496-1 of
the
Civil
Code
should
be
interpreted
in order
to cover
particularly
serious
personal
injuries
for
surviving
victim
of
spouse
harmed
in a
particularly
serious
way.
http://www.dgsi.pt/jstj.nsf/954f0ce6ad9dd8b980256b5f003fa814/7
bc174e495442fb180257cd8005c93a9?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,6430%2F07 |
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The
amount
of
compensation
is fixed
equitably
by the
court,
taking
into
account
, in any
case ,
the
circumstances
referred
to in
Article
494 ; in
case of
death ,
they can
be met
not only
the
injuries
suffered
by the
victim,
as
suffered
by
persons
entitled
to
compensation
pursuant
to the
preceding
paragraphs.
Art 494
: Where
liability
is based
on mere
guilt,
the
compensation
can be
fixed,
equitably,
in an
amount
less
than
that
would
correspond
to the
damage,
since
the
degree
of
culpability
of the
agent,
their
economic
position
and the
one of
the
injured
and
other
circumstances
of the
case
require
it. |
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As such rights (right to good name and reputation and right
to
freedom
of
expression)
are not
absolute
(as is
clearly
instilled
in Art
18-2,3
of the
Constitution
and Art
8-2 and
10-2 of
the
European
Convention
for the
Protection
of Human
Rights
and
Fundamental
Freedoms)
nor is
any
hierarchy
established,
the
latent
conflict
between
them is
an
issue,
which is
resolved
according
to
casuistic
standards
and,
often,
with
different
solutions
from
jurisdiction
to
jurisdiction
or even
within
the same
jurisdiction.
In the European judicial area, due to its linkage to the
European
Convention
for the
Protection
of Human
Rights
and
Fundamental
Freedoms,
the
European
Court of
Human
Rights
has come
to look
into
such
issues,
developing
a
jurisprudence
which
already
ensures
a
minimum
uniformity
in the
treatment
and
resolution
of this
problem,
and
where we
can find
basic
guidelines
for
addressing
the
concrete
situations
that are
being
put to
the
discretion
of
courts.
According to this jurisprudence:
1) Freedom of expression, as enshrined in article 10 of the
Convention,
is one
of the
essential
foundations
of a
democratic
society
based on
pluralism,
tolerance
and
open-mindedness,
and is
one of
the
basic
conditions
for the
progress
of
society
and for
personal
fulfilment
of each
one of
its
members.
2) It can establish itself as a major means of ensuring the
effective
enjoyment
of other
fundamental
freedoms,
including
freedom
of
assembly
and
association.
3) It applies not only to what is seen as favourable or
inoffensive,
but also
to what
offends,
shocks
or
disturbs.
4) It applies also in the field of labor relations, public
and
private,
but
should
be
public
whistleblowing
should
be
preceded,
unless
impracticable,
by
internal
reporting.
5) Freedom of expression guarantee in relation to the media
is of
particular
importance
given
the
latter's
role in
a
democratic
society,
where
are
required
pluralism
of
ideas,
information
circulation
and
public
scrutiny.
6) The exercise of freedom of expression, however, implies
duties,
namely
respect
for the
values
and
rights
provided
for in
art 10-2
of the
Convention,
and
responsibilities,
particularly
in the
case of
claims
without
factual
foundation
or
uttered
in bad
faith.
7) However, in the discussion of matters of public interest
the
possibility
of
restricting
freedom
of
expression
is very
limited.
8) It is necessary to distinguish between imputation of
facts
and
value
judgments,
since
the
facts
are able
to be
demonstrated
whereas
the
validity
of value
judgments
is not
susceptible
of
proof,
being
sufficient
the
existence
of
adequate
factual
basis.
9) A clear distinction should be made between criticism and
insult,
the
latter
in
principle
justifying
sanctions.
10) It is general economic interest and particular interest
of the
capital
owners
and of
workers
that
companies
can
defend
(and be
respected)
its
commercial
reputation
and its
viability.
This
interest,
however,
is
devoid
of own
moral
dimension
of
individual
reputation.
11) Freedom of speech, when exercised in good faith and on
matters
of
public
interest,
does not
cease to
be
legitimate
involving
false
facts or
causing
damage.
12) The State, in addition to the obligation not to
interfere
with the
exercise
of this
freedom
also has
a
positive
obligation
to
protect
freedom
of
expression
against
the
interference
of
individuals
(eg
through
the use
of
disciplinary
powers).
13) According to the Convention art 10-2, the restrictions
on
freedom
of
expression
are of
strict
character,
requiring
prove
convincingly
justified,
and
having
to fill
fundamental
requirements:
be
prescribed
by law,
pursue a
legitimate
aim and
be
necessary
in a
democratic
society.
14) The legal provision limiting freedom of expression must
be clear
and
precise
in order
to allow
the
individual
to
foresee
the
consequences
of their
actions,
and
regular
for
predicting
their
behaviour.
15) In order to be considered necessary in a democratic
society
the
interference
must
correspond
to a
pressing
social
need.
16) Politicians, public figures and senior officials of
government
acting
as such
are
subject
to wider
limits
of
acceptable
criticism
than
private.
17) Is justified, however, the limitation of freedom of
expression
in
defence
of
privacy
of third
parties,
even
public
figures,
when the
exercise
of this
is
motivated
by mere
intention
of
sensationalism
or mere
satisfaction
of
curiosity.
18) The proportionality of the interference with respect to
a value
judgment
depends
on the
existence
of a
sufficient
factual
basis
for such
a
judgment.
19) the nature and severity of the sanction and the
relevance
and
sufficiency
of the
reasons
for the
decisions
of
national
courts
are of
particular
relevance
to
assess
the
proportionality
of the
interference,
whose
appraisal
belongs
ultimately,
and
despite
the
margin
of
appreciation
that
belongs
to each
of the
States,
to the
European
judge.
20) The sanctions may not be of such severity that they
have the
effect
of
deterring
(particularly
the
press)
to take
part in
the
discussion
of
matters
that
rise the
public
interest
or
escape
the
democratic
or
judicial
scrutiny,
including
when
such
participation
is
performed
through
artistic
or
satirical
expression
or as
well
through
scientific
research.
21) the rules of the political game and of the free
exchange
of ideas
(particularly
through
the
media)
guarantors
of a
democratic
society
allow
the
involvement
of the
public
debate
recourse
to a
degree
of
exaggeration,
even
provocation,
albeit
with
some
immoderation
and even
sliding
into the
personal
level.
http://www.dgsi.pt/jtrl.nsf/33182fc732316039802565fa00497eec/
5ec1817faa492ddd802579ac0050a27c?OpenDocument&Highlight=0,Rijo,Ferreira |
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The
February
7, 2008
Ruling
of the
Supreme
Court of
Justice
first
states
-
In the
field of
thought,
expression
and
information,
the rule
is
freedom.
- This
basic
idea of
freedom
includes,
however,
restrictions.
- In the concrete border between this and these should be
taken
into
account
the art.
10 of
the
European
Convention
on Human
Rights
and,
concomitantly,
the
interpretatio
that
makes
the
European
Court of
Human
Rights
must be
upheld. |
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The
March
12, 2009
Ruling
of the
Supreme
Court of
Justice
states
In case
of
offense
(or
threat
of it)
to the
human
personality,
the law
admits,
moreover,
civil
liability
of the
offending
agent,
if all
the
conditions
of such
liability,
namely
fault
and
checking
the
damage,
the
damage
being
the
essential
condition
of
responsibility,
being no
liability
without
damage.
The right to honor is one of the most important achievements
of the
protection
of
personality
rights .
Being honor an immaterial achievement of personality, which
translates
into a
claim or
right of
the
individual
not to
be
vilified
in its
value in
the eyes
of
society
and is a
mode of
free
development
of human
dignity,
a value
to which
the
Constitution
assigns
the
relevance
of
founding
the
Portuguese
State.
Our Civil Code consecrated the thesis that moral damages
are
entitled
to
compensations,
limiting
them
however,
to those
which by
their
seriousness,
deserve
the
protection
of law.
This
seriousness
should
be
measured
by a
standard
objective
and not
by
subjective
factors,
although
these
resulting
from the
specific
circumstances
in which
the
offense
occurred,
temper
it
necessarily.
Freedom of the press, implying the corresponding freedom of
expression
and
creativity
for
journalists,
fully is
part of
the
fundamental
rights
(Art 38
of the
Portuguese
Republic
Constitution),
steming
the
limits
to such
freedom
from the
law -
fundamental
and
ordinary
– in
order to
safeguard
the
accuracy
and
objectivity
of
information
and
ensure
the
citizens'
rights
to
reputation,
privacy,
image
and
speech.
It is the essential duty of the journalist to scrupulously
respect
the
rigor
and
objectivity
of the
information,
confirming
facts,
hearing
the
interested
parties,
the
imputation
of facts
to
someone
without
evidence
constituting
a
serious
fault in
respect
of their
code of
ethics.
The ECHR has firmed jurisprudencia, under art 10-2,
concerning
freedom
of
expression
be valid
not only
for the
information
regarded
as
inoffensive
or
indifferent
but also
for
those
who
contradict,
shock or
offend.
However,
the
exercise
of that
freedom
is
subject
to
restrictions
and
sanctions.
The ECHR
itself
recognizes
to each
State a
margin
of
performance,
respecting
the
internal institutions on honor and good name and, of
course,
art 484
of the
CC (see
note
14).
The press, in the exercise of public function, should not
publish
charges
that
affect
the
honor of
persons
and that
they
know are
inaccurate,
having
not been
able to
prove
the
inaccuracy
or to
get
sufficient
information
on it.
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Quotation
missing. |
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http://www.dgsi.pt/jstj.nsf/954f0ce6ad9dd8b980
256b5f003fa814/f56277e65afcc70180256f48005816cf?OpenDocument |
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Revista
n.º
1963/07-7.ª
Secção
http://www.stj.pt/ficheiros/jurisp-sumarios/civel/sumarios-civel-2007.pdf |
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http://www.dgsi.pt/jtrl.nsf/33182fc732316039802565fa00497
eec/b38835785ddd48db8025709e0048af6f?OpenDocument |
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English
version
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx?i=001-141197
This is
a case
where
art 6-2
of the
Convention
was at
stake (Everyone
charge
with a
criminal
offence
shall be
presumed
innocent
until
proved
guilty
according
to law.)
A
Turkish
national,
Z.
Karaman,
founder
of the
Turkish
TV
station
Kanal 7
and
director
of a
company
that
broadcasts
to
Germany,
was
investigated
with
co-suspects
in 2006
by
German
authorities
about
the
fraudulent
use for
their
own
benefit
of funds
donated
to
associations.
On 11
March
2008 the
preliminary
criminal
proceedings
against
the
applicant
were
separated
from the
investigations
against
the
co-suspects
and in
the
middle
of 2008
criminal
investigations
based on
the same
allegations
of fraud
were
also
initiated
against
the
applicant
in
Turkey.
On 6
December
2008 the
applicant
lodged a
complaint
with the
Federal
Constitutional
Court,
alleging
under
art 6-2
that
references
to his
participation
in a
criminal
offence
in
judgment
rendered
against
separately
prosecuted
co-suspects
violated
his
right to
be
presumed
innocent.
In
September
2009 the
Court
dismissed
the
complaint.
The
Constitutional
Court
pointed
out that
the
presumption
of
innocence
did not
protect
the
applicant
ab
initio
from any
factual
impact
of
statements
made in
a
judgment
rendered
in
criminal
proceedings
against
third
persons
with
respect
to his
own
involvement
in the
commission
of the
offence.
That
judgment
did not
constitute
a
decision
that
required
the
determination
of the
applicant’s
guilt or
exposed
him to
disadvantages
amounting
to a
conviction
or
sentence.
ZK could
not be
regarded
as
guilty
on the
basis of
that
judgment
and was
still
protected
by the
principle
of the
presumption
of
innocence.
The fact
that the
establishment
of the
facts by
the
Regional
Court
not only
concerned
the
accused,
who were
convicted
at the
end of
the
proceedings,
but also
the
applicant
was an
inevitable
consequence
of the
fact
that in
complex
criminal
proceedings
it was
hardly
ever
possible
to
conduct
and
terminate
the
proceedings
against
all the
accused
simultaneously.
On 20
August
2009 the
Frankfurt
am Main
prosecution
authorities
brought
charges
against
the
applicant
and
three
co-accused
in
connection
with the
events
in
issue.
It
further
appears
that on
9 April
2012 the
Ankara
General
Prosecutor’s
Office
brought
similar
charges
against
the
applicant
and that
his
trial in
Turkey
commenced
on 16
January
2013.
The ECHR found nothing in the judgment of the Frankfurt am
Main
Regional
Court
that
made it
impossible
for the
applicant
to have
a fair
trial in
the
cases in
which he
was
involved
and
dismissed
the
alleged
violation
of
Convention
art 6-2. |
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English
version
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/Pages/search.aspx?i=001-122859
This is
also a
case
where
art 6-2
of the
Convention
was at
stake.
A
British
lady, L.
Allen,
complained
against
a
decision
of
justice,
following
her
acquittal,
to
refuse
her
compensation
for a
miscarriage
of
justice,
arguing
that her
right to
be
presumed
innocent
was thus
violated.
LA was convicted on 7 September 2000 by a jury at Nottingham Crown
Court of
the
manslaughter
of her
four-month
old son
(shaken
baby
syndrom)
and
sentenced
to three
years’
imprisonment.
She
didn’t
appela
on time,
but
following
a
general
review
in which
medical
experts
had been
relied
upon,
she was
granted
an
appeal.
In July
2005,
the
Court
quashed
LA’s
conviction
on the
ground
that it
was
unsafe.
LA
applied
for
compensation,
bt the
Home
Secretary
replied
that she
didn’t
fulfil
the
statutory
requirements
because
the
medical
evidence
didn’t
disclose
a new
fact. LA
challenged
the
decision
but her
claim
was
dismissed
by the
High
Court in
December
2007. LA
appealed,
but on
15 July
2008 the
Court of
Appeal
(Civil
Division)
dismissed
the
claim.
Then LA
sought
leave to
appeal
to the
House of
Lords by
it was
refused
on 11
December
2008.
The ECHR was satisfied that the judgments of the High Court
and the
Court of
Appeal
in this
case did
not
demonstrate
a lack
of
respect
for the
presumption
of
innocence
which LA
enjoys
in
respect
of the
criminal
charge
of
manslaughter
of which
she has
been
acquitted.
Accordingly
there
had been
no
violation
of
Article
6-2 of
the
Convention. |
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The general
duties are
a) The duty
exemption, b
) The duty
of zeal, c )
The duty of
obedience, d
) The duty
of loyalty,
e) The duty
of
confidentiality,
f ) The duty
of
correction,
g ) The duty
of
attendance,
h ) The duty
of
punctuality. |
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It is not
actually the
article 12,
but the
article 13. |
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idem, read
13-3 |
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